Current attack-event status. No active inbound DDoS as of the latest probe; standing L7 mitigation engaged on backup mirrors.
No active inbound DDoS event has been observed by the probe in the past 24 hours. The standing layer-7 challenge on backup A and backup B mirrors is engaged as part of normal operation, not as an active mitigation response. The headline mirror is running without the L7 challenge.
If a DDoS event is in progress as you read this, the homepage incident panel will carry an “investigating” tag at the top with a real timestamp. Recovery from L7 floods historically completes within 30 minutes; the longest in the editorial archive was the March event at 26 minutes from advisory to recovery.
There is no address to filter and no upstream provider to absorb traffic. Requests arrive through the same rendezvous machinery as legitimate ones, which makes separating them expensive. That is why the countermeasures are queues and multiple addresses rather than filtering.
Slow pages rather than an error. Gates that take longer. Connections that establish and then stall partway. The service is usually still working, just rationing, and treating that as an outage sends people looking for alternatives they do not need.
Patience and the next address in the list. Repeated attempts during a flood are indistinguishable from the flood itself, get you nothing, and make the queue longer for everybody including you.
Flooding costs the attacker resources continuously while defending costs the operator far less per request. Most episodes resolve within hours, which is why waiting is a strategy rather than a lack of one.
Component states, the 90 day uptime history and the incident log live on the status dashboard. This page covers one question in depth rather than repeating the board.